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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
means of transportation without discrimination against legiti-
mate forms of transportation" and fostering of "sound economic
conditions among all classes of carriers."'010 To accomplish an
objective clearly within such legislative intent, the commission
could have formulated rules of practice in advance which would
encompass the complaint of a private carrier, but even in the ab-
sence of such a rule of practice formulated in advance, the com-
mission was recognized as having power to proceed on an ad hoc
basis. 0 7
The Louisiana Tank Truck Carriers case would seem to dis-
pose of a problem thought to be posed by a decision of the First
Circuit last term which, in effect, directed an electric coopera-
tive, exempt from commission regulation, to nonetheless look for
relief to the commission against alleged invasion of territory by
a regulated utility. 08 The same commission authority relied
upon to enable it to entertain the complaint of an unregulated
private carrier would seem to permit entertainment of the com-
plaint of an unregulated electric cooperative.
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
The question whether a particular claim has been discharged
in bankruptcy is generally one for the state courts. Adjudica-
tion of an individual bankrupt is treated as an application for a
discharge,' and the discharge will be granted unless the bank-
ruptcy court is satisfied that the bankrupt has obtained a pre-
vious discharge within six years or has been guilty of conduct
condemned by Section 14c of the Bankruptcy Act.2 Section 173
provides that certain types of debt are not affected by a dis-
106. Id. at 17.
107. Ibid.
108. Pointe Coupee Electric Membership Corp. v. Central Louisiana Electric
Co., 140 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
*Visiting Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Bankruptcy Act § 14a, 11 U.S.C. § 32a (1958). A corporate bankrupt,
however, must still make application.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 32c (1958). The six-year provision, § 14c(4), is the only
ground for denial of a discharge not based on culpable conduct of the bankrupt.
Obtaining money or property by means of a materially false statement in writing
respecting one's financial condition is a ground, § 14c(3), but since 1960 this
has applied only to persons "engaged in business."
3. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958).
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charge. Ordinarily, however, the bankruptcy court will not con-
sider the dischargeability of particular debts,4 and the creditor
must assert his claim after bankruptcy if he believes it to be
preserved by Section 17.
In such a post-bankruptcy action, the debtor will plead his
discharge in bankruptcy. The burden is then on the creditor to
establish that his claim is within one of the excepted classes.
The provision most commonly used for this purpose is found in
Section 17a(2) :
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all
of his provable debts,... except such as ... (2) are liabili-
ties for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or
false representations, 5 or for obtaining money or property on
credit, or obtaining the extension or renewal of credit in re-
liance upon a materially false statement in writing respect-
ing his financial condition made or published or caused to
be made or published in any manner whatsoever with intent
to deceive ......
Several claims assertedly within this language have been
brought to the Louisiana appellate courts in the past year. Ac-
cording to the leading Louisiana case of DeLatour v. Lala,6 the
plaintiff must show: "(1) That defendant made false repre-
sentations; (2) that these representations were made with the
intention of defrauding the plaintiff, and (3) that the plaintiff
relied upon and was misled by the false representations." Three
recent cases7 where the proof was held to meet these require-
ments need no comment. In three other cases where an inaccu-
rate financial statement was submitted to a loan company, it
was held that reliance on the statement had not been proved.
In Excel Finance Baronne, Inc. v. Abadie,8 the defendant who
was indebted to numerous loan companies had been borrowing
from companies affiliated with plaintiff for about ten years and
from plaintiff itself for two or three years. These facts made
4. For analysis of the rule and of three exceptions to it, see 1 COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTCY 1699 (14th ed. 1956).
5. The rest of the quoted language was added in 1960, 74 STAT. 408 (1960).
Effects of the amendment are discussed in Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 638 (1961).
6. 15 La. App. 276, 131 So. 211, 212 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
7. Peoples Discount Co. of Shreveport v. Jones, 152 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1963) ; Liberal Finance Gentilly, Inc. v. Brister, 152 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963) Cash Finance Service No. 3 Inc. v. Rhoden, 145 So. 2d 79 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
8. 152 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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investigation easy and were considered to preclude reliance on
an application that listed no debts.
Excel Finance Baronne, Inc. v. Dobbs9 involved an applica-
tion for renewal of a loan which listed some but not all of ap-
plicant's other debts. Defendant testified that plaintiff's man-
ager led him to believe that he need not file a complete list. The
court, referring to "an increasing number of cases of this same
pattern" where loan companies had induced borrowers to pro-
vide a basis for post-bankruptcy enforcement of claims, accepted
the testimony as true and added that in any event the loan com-
pany could not have relied on a financial statement which "ob-
viously failed to reflect the borrower's total indebtedness at
the time."
Perdido Finance Co. v. Shephard'0 affirmed judgments for
the defendants where plaintiff had made inquiry at the Ex-
change of Consumer Finance Companies and at the Credit Bu-
reau before granting the loan, and had relied on the information
obtained from these sources rather than on the borrowers' fi-
nancial statement.
Denial of recovery in the circumstances of these three cases
seems correct.
In C H F Finance Co. v. Corca," the lender had required a
co-maker, and defendant urged that there was thus no reliance
on the financial statement. The evidence, however, showed a
partial reliance on the statement, which was held sufficient to
save the debt from discharge. Of the few cases considering the
point, most have reached this result.'2
If a dischargeable claim goes to judgment before a debtor
gets his discharge, he may still prevent the judgment from being
enforced. Two recent cases provide illustrations. In Blue Bonnet
Creamery, Inc. v. Simon,13 a creditor who had got a default judg-
ment for a debt allegedly based, in part, on the debtor's fraud,
petitioned after debtor's discharge for garnishment of the debt-
or's wages and obtained judgment against the garnishee. The
debtor brought a rule to show cause why the garnishment should
9. 146 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
10. 144 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Perdido Finance Co. v. Camp-
bell is the same case.
11. 152 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
12. See Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 638, 644 (1961).
13. 243 La. 683, 146 So. 2d 162 (1962).
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not be annulled on the ground of his discharge in bankruptcy,
and the creditor claimed that its judgment was within Section
17a(2), hence was not discharged. The Supreme Court believ-
ing that the court of appeal had insufficient evidence in the rec-
ord to make its findings, remanded to the trial court for further
proof on the issue of fraud. In League Central Credit Union v.
Warman,1 4 where judgment was obtained a few days before de-
fendant got his discharge in bankruptcy (no stay having been
applied for in the bankruptcy court), defendant sought to enjoin
enforcement of the judgment, and it was held that a prelimi-
nary injunction would issue as the order of discharge made out
at least a prima facie case.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Joseph Dainow*
The amount of international activity in Louisiana is not re-
flected in litigation before the Louisiana courts. Fortunately so.
It may be presumed that many international differences and
disputes are settled amicably on the advice of counsel for both
sides and in accordance with international law, or else they are
directed into diplomatic channels for settlement at the govern-
mental level. Accordingly, the case of Republic of Cuba v.
Mayan Lines, S.A.' is one of the infrequent instances of such
judicial determination in Louisiana.
In a prior suit by the Mayan Lines against the Republic of
Cuba, with attachment of Cuban property in Louisiana, the plea
of sovereign immunity had been withdrawn and a judgment
was rendered in accordance with a settlement agreement reached
by the parties. The present action was instituted by the Re-
public of Cuba, through a duly authorized local attorney, seek-
ing to annul the money judgment of the prior suit by reason of
alleged error, fraud, and ill practice. The lower court dismissed
this action on the grounds of lack of procedural capacity because
after the break in diplomatic relations between the United
States and Cuba the Republic of Cuba had designated the Gov-
14. 143 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 145 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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